



SHOULD DISSIMILAR USES OF TRADE SECRETS  
BE ACTIONABLE? 
CAMILLA A. HRDY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Fishman and Deepa Varadarajan address a critical question in their 
new article, Similar Secrets1: should trade secret law prohibit substantially 
dissimilar uses of trade secret information by those who took that information 
through improper means or in violation of a duty of confidentiality to the 
information’s owner, particularly when those dissimilar uses result in 
innovative new pursuits of high social value? For example, what if an engineer 
leaves her old company and uses trade secrets she learned there to start a new 
business in a totally different industry? Under current doctrine such an action 
would likely lead to a viable claim of trade secret misappropriation. But 
should this type of “retooling” really be discouraged by trade secret law? This 
is the question addressed by the authors. And it is an especially timely one, 
since trade secret law has been federalized via the Defend Trade Secrets Act 
of 2016 (DTSA).2 Like patents, copyrights, and trademarks, trade secrets are 
now the subject of federal civil law, rather than just state law.3 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law; Affiliated Fellow, Information 
Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks for insightful comments on this response from Dmitry 
Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online. 
1 Joseph Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2019). 
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018) (granting federal jurisdiction to civil actions against 
misappropriation). 
3 See generally Sharon Sandeen & Christopher Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of 
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (describing the potential development of 
a “federal common law” of trade secrecy); Camilla A. Hrdy, Sandeen and Seaman: Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/09/sandeen-and-seaman-toward-federal.html 
[https://perma.cc/6ZBC-H454] (suggesting an examination of trademark law for a “plausible 
historic precedent within the intellectual property genre for how a novel federal IP regime can 
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Fishman and Varadarajan challenge the current approach for determining 
misappropriation in trade secret law—which assesses whether a defendant’s 
end use is “substantially derived” from the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.4 They argue 
the law should instead take into account the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s end 
uses for the allegedly infringing information.5 Furthermore, they suggest that 
if the defendant’s end use is highly dissimilar from the plaintiff ’s, the law 
should not, as a general matter, prohibit it.6 Fishman and Varadarajan derive 
their “substantial similarity” limitation on infringement, more or less, from 
copyright law’s test for actionable copying and the doctrine of fair use.7 
Similar Secrets is well-written and full of useful insights; it is also highly 
controversial. This Response shows that the article’s thesis—that trade secret 
law should imitate copyright law’s willingness to permit substantially 
dissimilar uses of content—conflicts with trade secret law’s fundamental 
purpose: to protect the integrity of secret information. The Response also 
observes that trade secret law already has a doctrine that addresses many of 
the harms with which the authors are concerned. It is already black letter law 
that employees’ “general knowledge, skill, and experience” cannot be a trade 
secret.8 This subject-matter exclusion is intended to permit employees to 
learn on the job and then leave to pursue new opportunities.9 Whereas 
Fishman and Varadarajan have turned to copyright law for help, it makes 
more sense to focus on improving the doctrines we already have. Improving 
existing doctrines will do more to ameliorate concerns about hindering 
innovative new uses, while maintaining trade secret law’s fundamental goals. 
 
emerge on top of state common law regime”). For a discussion of the federalization of patent law 
and intellectual property law, see generally Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301 (2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 
89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133 (2018); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2013). Note that the new federal law, the DTSA, does not preempt 
state trade secret law. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2018) (“This chapter shall not be construed to preempt 
or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, State, 
commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”). 
Moreover, aspects of the law explicitly provide that federal remedies cannot interfere with state 
remedies. See, e.g., id. § 1836 (b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (prohibiting an injunction under the DTSA from 
“otherwise conflict[ing] with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful 
profession, trade, or business”). 




8 See Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11 & n.74) (“Courts within virtually every state and federal circuit have 
purported to recognize this general rule.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3332540 
[https://perma.cc/2C5D-LMFM]. 
9 Id. (manuscript at 33-36). 
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I. THE CURRENT “SUBSTANTIALLY DERIVED” STANDARD 
Fishman and Varadarajan begin by observing that trade secret law 
currently makes “dissimilar” end uses of trade secrets actionable. Thus, under 
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “an actor is liable for using the 
trade secret [even] with independently created improvements or 
modifications if the result is substantially derived from the trade secret.”10 The 
result has effectively been a “but-for” test that asks whether the defendant could 
have proceeded as she did without relying on the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.11 
The example of applying the substantial derivation test that Sharon 
Sandeen and Elizabeth Rowe give is a case involving a process for producing 
industrial synthetic diamond.12 In General Electric v. Sung,13 a former General 
Electric (GE) employee, Chien-Min Sung learned the details of GE’s process 
for making synthetic diamond in the course of his job at GE.14 When he left 
GE, Sung took “an abundance of documents, including drawings and process 
instructions.”15 Sung then contracted with a competitor in the synthetic 
diamond industry, Iljin, and agreed to transfer information about the process 
to Iljin.16 Iljin used the information to quickly develop its own process for 
producing synthetic saw-grade diamond, which involved a similar 5,000-ton 
apparatus.17 It had taken GE over twenty years to develop its “comparable” 
production process involving a different 5,000-ton piece of machinery.18 Iljin 
derived its process in only two years, because it acquired GE’s trade secrets 
through Sung, an insider who had received this information under an express 
or implied duty to maintain its secrecy.19 This type of unfair shortcut is classic 
trade secret misappropriation.20 
Is this misappropriation actionable even though Iljin did not use GE’s 
trade secrets to produce an identical process or an identical machine, or even 
identical synthetic diamond? The answer is clearly yes. The standing rule, 
 
10 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1064-65 (alterations in original) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995)). 
11 Id. at 1067 (“In some judicial formulations, the use element essentially becomes a but-for 
test: if the defendant wouldn’t have thought to pursue a particular research project without having 
first been exposed to the secret, it has committed misappropriation—regardless of how far afield 
that research leads.”). 
12 ELIZABETH ROWE & SHARON SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET 
LAW 423-27 (1st ed. 2012). 
13 843 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1994). 
14 Id. at 778. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 778-79. 
18 Id. at 779. 
19 Id. at 780. 
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (defining misappropriation to include the nonconsensual disclosure 
or use of another’s trade secret by an individual who had a duty to maintain its secrecy). 
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again, is that “[t]rade secret protection . . . extends not only to the 
misappropriated trade secret itself but also to materials ‘substantially derived’ 
from that trade secret.”21 
So far so good. But what if Sung used the drawings and process 
instructions—which GE had developed in order to make synthetic diamonds—
to start a bakery, Sung’s Kitchen, where Sung succeeded in developing the best 
damn chocolate chip cookies humanity has ever experienced? Sung discovered 
that all you have to do is put chocolate chips, butter, flour, and an egg (no baking 
powder required) into a 50-pound apparatus derived from GE’s 5,000-ton 
version and bake them for thirty seconds. Sung later franchises his bakery into 
a global operation that Forbes lists as the most profitable new company of the 
year and that provides cheap, delicious homemade cookies to the masses. 
Sung’s actions in this second hypothetical still constitute misappropriation, at 
least under trade secret law’s current “substantially derived” standard, because 
Sung apparently derived his method for making cookies directly from GE’s trade 
secret information. The fact that his end use for the information is quite different 
does not change the result under current doctrine. But Fishman and Varadarajan’s 
article urges us to question whether this outcome is truly normatively desirable. 
Surely, as Fishman and Varadarajan suggest, society would be better off if Sung 
were permitted to make and sell his delicious cookies. Us cookie eaters would 
benefit from Sung’s addition to the store of culinary knowledge. Additionally, 
GE’s position in the market for synthetic diamonds would remain intact even if 
Sung were to move forward with his bakery business. 
II. THE PROPOSED STANDARD: NO LIABILITY FOR UNFORESEEABLE USES 
Building on these sorts of arguments about the benefits of cumulative 
innovation, Fishman and Varadarajan assert that trade secret law’s current 
“substantially derived” standard is too restrictive for defendants like the 
fictional Sung, who seek to use trade secrets for activities that are significantly 
different from the secret’s original application and potentially quite 
productive.22 As currently applied, the rule “wrongly skips over an inquiry 
into the defendant’s ends” and thus creates liability even in the “ubiquitous 
scenario where a defendant’s product isn’t exactly like the plaintiff ’s.”23 
In Sung’s case, for example, the authors would argue that the law should 
not penalize Sung for deploying GE’s trade secrets in order to design a novel 
way to make chocolate chip cookies rather than to compete with GE in the 
synthetic diamond market. Their solution is to fundamentally alter trade 
 
21 Sung, 843 F. Supp. at 778-79. 
22 See Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1056-57. 
23 Id. 
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secret law’s standard for misappropriation by “consider[ing] not only the 
defendant’s benefit from knowing the secret, but also the exploitable asset, 
whether a product or a process, that the benefit ultimately translates into.”24 
Under their revised approach, the defendant would no longer  
be liable for using a lawfully acquired secret unless it is both exploiting an 
asset that incorporates material elements from the owner’s secret and is doing 
so in a market that the plaintiff actually foresaw or, given industry trends, 
could reasonably have foreseen. Merely relying on a secret as a launching pad 
for developing a genuinely dissimilar good, or operating in a remote and 
unanticipatable market, would remain permissible.25 
The upshot is that if a defendant uses a trade secret to develop a “genuinely 
dissimilar good” or to develop an application for the trade secret “in a remote 
and unanticipatable market,” this would not qualify as actionable use of trade 
secrets and would remain permissible. Plaintiffs would be able to control a 
defendant’s exploitation of trade secrets in “reasonably foreseeable markets”; 
but they would not be able to stop defendants from using the information in 
“remote [markets] that could not have been anticipated ex ante.”26 
The greatest new hurdle here is that the plaintiff now has to prove the 
defendant made a “material and foreseeable use [of plaintiff ’s trade secrets] 
as part of [the plaintiff ’s] case-in-chief.”27 For instance, in this case, GE would 
have to show that Sung used a quantitatively and qualitatively material aspect 
of GE’s trade secrets to make his new process and that GE “actually foresaw” 
Sung’s use or alternatively that a “reasonable firm” in GE’s industry would 
have foreseen Sung’s use of making cookies.28 If not, the adaptation would be 
permitted, despite the fact that Sung technically used GE’s trade secret 
information to make his cookies.29 
The authors derive this standard from copyright law or at least argue that 
copyright law provides a “proof of concept” for how their standard would 
work.30 In copyright law, protection does not cover any use of copyrighted 
expression. Rather, a fundamental premise of copyright infringement analysis 
 
24 Id. at 1057. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1057, 1079. At a more granular level, the authors propose three changes to the current 
substantial derivation doctrine: (1) compare the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s end uses rather than 
merely the steps they took along the way; (2) seek a “material” contribution from the trade secret, 
rather than simply asking whether the defendant could have acted as she did “but for” the trade 
secret; and (3) allow plaintiffs to control a defendant’s exploitation of trade secrets in “reasonably 
foreseeable markets but not in remote ones that could not have been anticipated ex ante.” Id. at 1079. 
27 Id. at 1059. 
28 See id. at 1092. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. at 1059. 
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is that “[m]erely copying something from a work isn’t enough.”31 The 
defendant must have actually copied (i.e. derived) her work from copyrighted 
expression, and the defendant’s end use must be “substantially similar” to 
protectable aspects of plaintiff ’s work.32 For example, if a movie copies minor 
aspects of someone’s novel in deriving the plot, this is not copyright 
infringement if, in the end, the movie is completely different from the novel.33 
III. THE CRITIQUE 
I agree with Fishman and Varadarajan’s premise that what the defendant 
does with trade secrets should matter in deciding liability, and that preventing 
totally different end uses of information can seem problematic from the 
standpoint of innovation policy. However, their proposal to narrow trade 
secret misappropriation to cover only sufficiently similar end uses faces 
several challenges. I focus on three here. First, the proposal contradicts trade 
secret law’s (versus copyright law’s) goal of preserving the secrecy of 
information. Second, it risks undermining trade secret law’s corollary 
function of facilitating efficient information sharing, especially between 
employers and employees. Third, it ignores the existence of alternative trade 
secret doctrines that, in my view, do a better job at mitigating trade secret 
law’s chilling effects on competition and innovation. In particular, trade secret 
law’s exclusion of “general knowledge, skill, and experience” allows former 
employees like Sung to leave their current job and use their improved skills, 
training, and experience to pursue new endeavors.34 
1. Conflict with Trade Secret Law’s Goal to Protect the  
Integrity of Secret Information 
The authors’ proposal contradicts the basic premise of trade secret law, 
which is to protect the integrity of secret information. Ideally, the trade secret 
owner will succeed in keeping their secrets internal without relying on 
litigation. But when unsanctioned use occurs, for instance by a departing 
 
31 Id. at 1073. 
32 Id. at 1073-74. 
33 See, e.g., Randolph v. Dimension Films, 630 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746-49 (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
(holding that a movie did not infringe a copyrighted novel despite certain similarities because “there 
is no substantial similarity in the protectable elements of the works. The basic elements of plot, 
themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events—and the overall concept 
and feel of both works—are very different”). 
34 Hrdy, supra note 8 (manuscript at 33-36). 
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employee, the trade secret lawsuit itself, and in particular the trade secret 
injunction, becomes the mechanism for protecting the secrecy of the information.35 
Copyright law is different: the risk of disclosure of secret information is 
not the focus. Copyright law protects original expression that has been fixed 
in a tangible medium.36 Except in the rarer cases where the author has not yet 
published,37 this original, fixed expression has typically already been publicly 
disclosed and disseminated. The goal of the copyright owner is generally to 
control and profit from further public dissemination. Accordingly, a copyright 
defendant’s “substantially similar” expression (reproduction, distribution, 
public performance, etc.38) is actionable, but a dissimilar one is not. Copyright 
law goes even further, permitting “fair” uses that are otherwise infringing, but 
that do not supplant the value of the original work.39 
Losses resulting from dissimilar or fair uses of a copyrighted work, such 
as lost sales or declining reputation, may be economically costly or 
inconvenient for the author. But they do not threaten the fundamental 
protections that copyright law affords. For example, if GE publishes a manual 
describing a method for making synthetic diamonds and Sung takes minimal 
amounts of expression or artfully quotes from the manual in his cookbook, 
Sung is not liable for copyright infringement because this is (one hopes) a 
dissimilar or at least fair use. 
But in the trade secret context, permitting even drastically dissimilar uses 
of secret information does threaten the fundamental protections trade secret 
law affords. When a defendant’s use results in public disclosure of the trade 
secret, this obviously must be actionable, regardless of whether it is the same 
or different type of use. To channel the Supreme Court, 
With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the 
very definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade 
secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the 
holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.40 
To their credit, the authors recognize the risk of secrecy destruction as a 
major limitation on their proposal. In their view, “[e]ven groundbreaking 
adapters should . . . still be accountable if after the fact they disclose the secret 
 
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2018) (generally permitting court to enjoin “actual or 
threatened misappropriation . . . on such terms as the court deems reasonable”). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
37 See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
(addressing copyright infringement and fair use with respect to unpublished works). 
38 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
39 Id. § 107. 
40 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984). 
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in ways likely to destroy its value . . . .”41 Just as well, “controlling against 
exclusivity-destroying disclosures” is necessary because “if the use winds up 
spilling the secret, it wipes out the entire value.”42 The authors also would not 
condone using “improper means” to acquire trade secrets,43 like trespass, 
hacking, or flying a plane over a factory to see a hidden process. This too is 
an essential caveat, because one of trade secret law’s three goals—along with 
providing incentives to invest in valuable information and to productively 
share that information with others in controlled disclosures—is to deter tort-
like breaches of duty and other acts that fall below standards of commercial 
morality in the industry.44 
The authors argue that, with these caveats, their proposal will “channel[]” 
putative defendants away from disclosing uses, immoral uses, and predictable 
competing uses, and towards unforeseeable uses with “large positive 
externalities.”45 So, in Sung’s case, he would not be liable under trade secret 
law for using GE’s process in the unforeseeable, noncompeting fashion of 
baking cookies, but he would be liable if his use threatened to publicly disclose 
the information or was premised on using improper means like spying to 
acquire the information. The authors thus echo arguments about reverse 
engineering’s productivity and cumulative innovation benefits made by 
scholars such as Pam Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer.46 
I don’t think this carve-out for “disclosing” uses will work. And if it does 
work, it will gut the authors’ proposal. The reason is that it is 
virtually impossible to identify uses of trade secrets that do not threaten 
disclosure of the original trade secret. Even if the plaintiff uses its trade secret 
process to make synthetic diamonds, and the defendant uses a derived but 
dramatically tweaked process to make chocolate chip cookies, there is always 
a chance the trade secret will inadvertently be disclosed by the defendant’s 
use and thereby eliminate the plaintiff ’s market advantage. For example, what 
if Sung’s security precautions are poor, and others access the information 
through him? Even if Sung’s security is excellent and the chocolate chip 
cookies are the only possible public vehicle for revelation of GE’s 
 
41 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1108-09. 
42 Id. at 1109. 
43 Id. 
44 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (“Trade secret law will 
encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent 
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered 
and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.”). 
45 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1109. 
46 Id.; see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1662 (2002) (“Reverse engineering is fundamentally directed to 
discovery and learning . . . . Reverse engineering leads to dependent creations, but this does not 
taint them, for in truth, all innovators stand on the shoulders of both giants and midgets.”). 
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information, third parties might be able to reverse engineer GE’s process 
using information contained in the cookies, even if they would not have been 
able to reverse engineer the process by studying the original diamonds. 
Essentially, a defendant’s use itself might not cause any competitive harm 
and might be totally unpredictable, but it can still destroy the trade secret in 
the end, because every use of a trade secret that is outside the trade secret 
owner’s control creates a new risk. Indeed, this proposal seems to contradict 
the requirement that trade secrets owners must take “reasonable measures to 
keep [the claimed] information secret.”47 At the least, it changes the standard 
for what is reasonable. Whereas before, GE had to craft secrecy precautions 
around the possibility of employees departing with trade secrets, now it 
would arguably be “unreasonable” to share information with employees at all 
because those employees can now use it more liberally. In short, even though 
Fishman and Varadarajan’s proposal ostensibly only loosens the 
misappropriation standard for certain insiders who use trade secrets 
noncompetitively, it effectively increases the risk of trade secret exposure to 
third parties and the general public as well. 
2. Reduced Willingness to Share with Employees 
This leads to my second critique, which is that the proposal substantially 
weakens the rights that trade secret owners currently have to protect trade 
secrets from their own employees and therefore risks hindering productive 
sharing between employers and employees. 
A primary purpose of trade secret law, as initially developed in the United 
States in the nineteenth century, has been to give employers new freedom to 
share trade secrets with employees outside the scope of traditional circles of 
loyalty. To quote the now-standard story, “[t]he invention of trade secret 
doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century enabled employers to enjoin 
revelation of secret information by current or former employees.”48 The 
Supreme Court drew this out in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp. in 1974, writing 
that trade secret protection is designed to stand against “breaches of 
confidence” in “the employee and licensee situations.”49 This is precisely why 
the “necessary element of secrecy is not lost . . . if the holder of the trade 
secret reveals [it] to another.”50 “These others may include . . . employees to 
 
47 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2018). 
48 Catherine Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and 
the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 442 (2001). See generally 
Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do 
Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010) (tracing the development 
of trade secret law). 
49 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484. 
50 Id. at 475. 
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whom it is necessary to confide it, in order to apply it to the uses for which 
it is intended.”51 Without trade secret law, the Court reasoned, employers 
would have incentives “to hoard rather than disseminate knowledge.”52 
Mark Lemley reiterated this argument in an oft-cited 2008 article: “It seems 
odd . . . for the law to encourage secrets, or to encourage only those 
inventions that are kept secret.”53 
If “unforeseeable” uses are suddenly nonactionable, the problem of “tech 
hoarding” reemerges with a vengeance. If employers do not feel it is safe to 
share trade secrets with employees, they might become overly cautious about 
doing so. Under Kewanee’s reasoning, we should expect employers to start to 
take costly self-help measures, ranging from physical security measures to 
overreliance on nondisclosure contracts, or perhaps even refuse to hire 
altogether.54 This would not only lead to inefficiency in the workplace,55 but 
also reduce the chance that employees ever get access to the starting materials 
they need to launch new pursuits.56 
Closely related, the proposal would require a reconfiguration of the 
standard for what constitutes a breach of a “duty to maintain the secrecy of 
the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret.”57 Since the authors have 
taken “improper means” cases off the table, they are mainly addressing insider 
cases, where an employee, a business partner, or a contractor breaches a duty 
not to use or disclose the secret. Narrowing actionable uses of trade secrets 
to “foreseeable” uses would require rethinking the circumstances in which 
 
51 Id. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 Id. at 486. 
53 Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 313 (2008). 
54 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 486 (“Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees 
of those still active in research. Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and 
fringe benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret invention 
would be fixed in an amount thought sufficient to assure their loyalty.”); see also Michael Risch, Why 
Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (“[T]he ability to protect 
against employees absconding with information is difficult and costly . . . .”). 
55 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“The more Rockwell restricts access to its drawings, either by its engineers or by the vendors, the 
harder it will be for either group to do the work expected of it.”); Risch, supra note 54, at 41 (“[T]he 
owner would have to choose between inefficient ways to keep information from being taken by 
employees, suing for the limited remedies available for breach of contract, or paying the employees 
more than they could gain by absconding.”). 
56 One might respond that trade secret law already exposes employers to the risk of disclosure 
because, unlike patent law, it permits learning trade secrets through “reverse engineering”—taking 
apart a product to discern its secrets. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (2018). But this point is inapposite. 
Trade secret law legalizes reverse engineering for the same reason it legalizes obtaining trade secrets 
through independent derivation: these acts rely purely on information in the public domain and do 
not draw on confidential disclosures. The process of reverse engineering could be deemed tainted, 
for example, if the trade secret owner’s former employees are involved. 
57 See id. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II) (defining “misappropriation”). 
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a person is placed under a duty to maintain secrecy. At present, employees 
are held to have an implicit, if not explicit, duty to maintain the secrecy of 
their employers’ trade secrets and to not use or disclose them for any reason 
without authorization. But under the authors’ proposal, this duty would 
effectively contain the implicit caveat: “Unforeseeable ones, which the 
plaintiff did not and could not reasonably have predicted at the time it 
decided to invest in developing the secret, should be permitted.”58 
The fact that implementing the foreseeability standard requires 
reconfiguring trade secret law’s duty to maintain secrecy, and effectively 
rewriting the employment contract, should warrant significant pause. 
3. Trade Secret Law Already Permits Employees to Use Their  
“General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience” 
Creating a new outlet for productive uses of trade secrets that do not risk 
disclosure or cause market harm is a laudable goal. But trade secret law 
already has an equitable doctrine to address the authors’ concerns: the 
doctrine that employees remain free to use their “general knowledge, skill, 
and experience,” notwithstanding the restrictions of trade secret law.59 This 
preserves a much larger swath of productive activity, without introducing an 
entirely new risk of information disclosure into the law. 
Fishman and Varadarajan appear to assume trade secret law currently 
prevents employees from pursuing the work of their choosing upon 
departure. “A popular refrain in misappropriation cases,” they write, “is that 
courts ‘cannot compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate 
of his memory.’”60 “But often it seems like they’re trying to.”61 Relatedly, the 
authors assert that injunctions are often granted as a matter of course.62 But 
this isn’t quite true. As I explain in my article The General Knowledge, Skill, 
and Experience Paradox, it is already black letter law that “general knowledge, 
skill, and experience” cannot be a trade secret.63 This doctrine was designed 
 
58 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1058. To get around this problem, the authors suggest 
that their proposal can be inserted into the statutory definition of “use.” Id. at 1107-08. But in practice, 
the proposal would necessarily alter what it means for a recipient of certain information to have a 
duty to maintain secrecy. A recipient who uses trade secrets in ways that are foreseeable to the trade 
secret owner would be in breach of a duty but not, generally speaking, otherwise. 
59 See generally Hrdy, supra note 8 (examining the development and modern misapplication of 
the “general knowledge, skill, and experience” doctrine). 
60 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1078 (quoting Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 23 
Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1112 (noting that “a number of courts continue to presume that trade secret 
misappropriation produces irreparable harm and that successful plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 
an injunction,” and “other courts treat perpetual injunctions as the default”). 
63 Hrdy, supra note 8 (manuscript at 11 & n.74). 
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precisely to ensure that former employees can leave and pursue new work, 
even after learning their employer’s trade secrets.64 Courts will often use this 
doctrine to limit the scope of trade secret subject matter65 or at least narrow 
injunctions against employees to shield their ability to continue working in 
the field.66 Courts continue to apply this doctrine today.67 
4. Are Analogies Between Trade Secret Law and Copyright Useful? 
Lastly, I question more generally whether analogies between copyright 
law and trade secret law are useful. I think this article is an example of where 
this cross-IP approach is interesting, fascinating, and educational. But I am 
not sure making analogies to copyright law is where we want to be in the end. 
Copyright law is fundamentally about encouraging creative expressions of 
ideas and the disclosure and dissemination of those ideas while using a 
plethora of doctrines to preserve the creator’s productive uses of preexisting 
materials. However, trade secret law is fundamentally about addressing 
breaches of duty and making it feasible to preserve the secrecy of valuable 
information while also engaging in productive sharing of that information. 
Just because copyright law tolerates dissimilar uses does not inevitably 
suggest that trade secret law should try to replicate this approach.68 Moreover, 
 
64 Id. (manuscript at 33-36). 
65 See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 143-44 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (holding that the alleged trade secret was actually a general approach to manufacturing 
tape recorders); Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 777 (Pa. 1965) 
(reasoning that the alleged trade secret was generalized knowledge relating to “the field of 
deliquescent dessicant [sic] air driers”). 
66 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1262-66 (3d Cir. 1985); T-N-T 
Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24-26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
67 A recent Judge Rakoff case illustrates just how far this doctrine can extend to deny trade 
secret protection against departing employees. See In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 454, 
465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The Individual Defendants’ general knowledge of the revenue attributable to 
each client is further not protectable, since labeling this kind of knowledge as proprietary would 
prevent former employees from ever pursuing clients or customers whom they believe generate 
substantial business for their former employers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
68 In his paper The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, Mark Lemley reaches a similar conclusion, 
suggesting that it may be appropriate to extend liability to dissimilar uses of trade secret 
information, even if this approach does not make sense in other IP regimes like copyright. Mark 
Lemley, Essay, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 267 (2017). Professor 
Lemley maintains that “it makes sense for trade secret law, but not other IP regimes, to adopt the 
fruit of the poisonous tree rule [which creates liability for uses that are tainted with the right owner’s 
information] as a default.” Id.; see also id. at 250 (“[I]f trade secret law were not flexible enough to 
encompass modified or even new products that are substantially derived from the trade secret of 
another, the protections that law provides would be hollow indeed.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1996))). That said, 
Professor Lemley also endorses Professor Varadarajan’s argument, which she made in a previous 
article, that trade secret law should have a “fair use” outlet similar to copyright law. Id. at 269 n.110 
(referencing Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401 (2014)). 
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trade secret law already has its own set of doctrines, including the “general 
knowledge, skill, and experience” exclusion, which limit the scope of claimed 
subject matter and cabin the scenarios that are actionable. One solution 
would be to focus on improving these existing doctrines and correcting the 
existing foibles in courts’ understandings and applications, rather than 
drawing on an external IP regime. 
This suggestion does not need to end at copyright law, either. To the 
extent we feel the need to draw on similar concepts like copyright law, we 
could also appeal to broader principles that stem from outside of IP law, such 
as tort law and contract law—both of which appear to have quite a lot in 
common with trade secret law.69 We could even stay inside the trade-secret-
law sphere in order to get to the same place.70 
CONCLUSION 
Disagreements aside, I absolutely love this article. By identifying 
doctrines in this crucial and evolving area of intellectual property law that 
may need to be revisited and reconfigured, Fishman and Varadarajan have 
certainly moved the discussion of trade secret law forward. I also suspect that 
we will begin to see more of this type of scholarship—that is, comparative 
proposals that analyze trade secret doctrine alongside more established 
federal IP regimes. I see this as a welcome development, but also one that 
requires close attention. We have to recognize that there are limitations in 
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In contrast, the arguments in this Response would generally weigh against a “trade secret fair use” 
outlet as well. 
69 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 1, at 1093 (“[A] foreseeability limitation has an excellent 
pedigree. From tort law’s proximate causation to contract law’s doctrine of impossibility, courts have 
tried to cabin liability when an intervening event genuinely cannot be anticipated.”). 
70 For instance, as the authors note, plaintiffs in many trade secret cases already have to prove 
proximate causation, at least with respect to damages. See In re TXCO Res., Inc., 475 B.R. 781, 822-
23 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012) (“In order to recover actual damages, TXCO was first required to show 
that Peregrine’s use of TXCO’s trade secrets proximately caused TXCO to suffer a specific injury. 
Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) foreseeability, and (2) cause in fact.”). 
